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Foreign Direct Investment and International Migration to Dutch Cities 
 
 
Introduction 
 
OECD countries attracted a substantial number of immigrants from developing countries 
in recent decades, and many studies have been devoted to assessing the causes of this 
phenomenon. The dominant push-factor explanations revolve around underdevelopment 
and population pressures in developing countries, while pull-factor explanations often 
focus on demand for low-skilled workers in developed ones (Massey et al., 1993). These 
classical push and pull factors are practically undisputed, have been corroborated 
numerous times, and are considered as the ‘the root causes’ (Martin, 1995, p. 820; cf. 
Castles and Miller, 2008) for migration from poor to rich countries. Yet, according to 
Sassen (Sassen-Koob, 1984b, 1986; Sassen, 1988, 2006b), the current phase of economic 
globalisation yields an additional push and pull factor for such migration, which she 
combined into an overarching theoretical framework. 
 The new push factor is the alleged uprooting of traditional work structures in less-
developed countries due to foreign direct investments. This uprooting, in combination 
with the economic and cultural links that result from foreign investments is claimed to 
initiate migration flows from investment-receiving to investment-sending countries. The 
new pull factor in Sassen’s framework is the high demand for low-skilled workers in 
cities in developed economies due to the clustering of advanced producer services. 
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 Sassen formulated the overarching theoretical framework that comprises this push 
and pull factor already in the early 1980s and has repeated it ever since (2006b). Very 
remarkably, in those three decades it has not been empirically assessed. As a result, its 
empirical validity remains unanswered, and it is consequently not clear whether the 
current phase of economic globalisation indeed yields the abovementioned push and pull 
factors for migration from developing to OECD countries. This lack in the research 
literature has not gone unnoticed, and several migration scholars therefore urged 
researchers to assess the FDI-migration nexus empirically (cf. Massey et al., 1993; 
Sassen, 2006b). This article takes the first step by, firstly, assessing whether migration 
from less-developed economies to cities in developed ones can be explained by 
investment flows. Secondly, it will assess whether the high demand for low-skilled 
workers in cities due to the clustering of advanced producer services functions as a pull 
factor for these migration flows.  
To do so, it will focus on migration to cities in the Netherlands, which is a 
strategic case for three reasons. Firstly, the Dutch economy is renowned for its substantial 
outward investment flows into developing countries and for its immigrant inflows from 
non-OECD countries (De Beer and Koster, 2009). Secondly, previous research showed it 
harbours a substantial number of cities that widely differ in their employment share in the 
advanced producer services and the concomitant demand for low-skilled service workers 
(Van der Waal, 2010, 2012; Van der Waal and Burgers, 2011). Thirdly, these cities are 
embedded in a centralistic welfare state that affects all cities’ labour markets equally, and 
as such does not interfere the analyses. The Netherlands, in short, is an ideal case for the 
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research at hand, and the following section will elaborate the theoretical notions that 
inform that research. 
 
 
Foreign direct investment and international migration 
 
The push factor of the new immigration: foreign direct investment  
According to Sassen (1988, 2006b; Sassen-Koob 1984a), global economic integration 
stimulates labour migration movements from poor to rich countries. The pivot on which 
everything hinges in her argument is the new international division of labour. This 
division of labour results from the (re)location of production processes from highly 
developed economies – roughly put: OECD countries – to less-developed economies that 
can mainly be found in Asia, South America and Africa. Due to this (re)location – often 
referred to as foreign direct investments (FDI) –, a large part of the production of 
multinational firms by now takes place in less-developed economies. As a result, many of 
those firms directly or indirectly employ a substantial number people there. 
 Sassen argues that this causes a ‘disruption of traditional work structures’ due to 
‘the transformation of subsistence workers into wage-labor’ (Sassen, 1988, p. 18; cf. 
Massey, 1988). Those who find employment in the production plants that result from 
such investments mostly come from self-sufficient family economies in rural areas. In 
sharp contrast, the activities employed in the production plants created by foreign 
investments, is directed at mass production of export goods for western markets, and 
often located in coastal regions. Finding employment in those production plants therefore 
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most times entails a transition from subsistence worker to wage labourer, and domestic 
migration from rural hinterlands to urban coastal regions. According to Sassen, these 
intra-regional migrations ‘eventually may overflow into long-distance migration’ (Sassen, 
1988, p. 18; cf. Massey et al., 1993) to the advanced economies, especially to those where 
the investments came from. The central idea behind this is that:  
 
the presence of such investments creates cultural-ideological and objective links with the 
countries providing this capital (…) Besides the long recognized westernization effect of 
large-scale foreign investment in the less developed world, there is the more specific 
impact on workers employed in production for export or in the services in the export 
sector. These workers are using their labor power in the production of goods and services 
demanded by people and firms in the U.S. or any other highly developed country. The 
distance between a job in the off-shore plant or office and in the on-shore plant is 
subjectively reduced. Under these conditions emigration may begin to emerge as an 
option actually felt by individuals’ (Sassen, 1988, p. 18-19).  
 
 If so, this means that there might be another explanation for the well-documented 
migration from underdeveloped economies to the advanced ones, besides the 
explanations mostly referred to in the literature: ‘classical’ push factors such as 
underdevelopment and population pressures. Yet, that is not to say that the FDI and 
‘classical’ explanations are mutually exclusive, but that the former is additional to the 
latter in times when less-developed economies industrialise due to foreign direct 
investments. This implies that by now two mechanisms account for migration from those 
economies to their highly-developed counterparts. The classical one that stresses the 
‘push’ that people experience in less-developed economies because the lack of economic 
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opportunities, and the mechanism that revolves around the uprooting process that results 
from foreign direct investments. If both mechanisms are at work, the migration flows 
induced by the underdevelopment, are by now accompanied by migration flows induced 
by foreign direct investments. As such, the FDI explanation aims to explain recent 
immigration flows from less-developed countries to cities in the advanced economies. In 
her publications on this subject Sassen therefore consequently labels these migration 
flows as ‘the new immigration phase’ (Sassen-Koob, 1984b, p. 158), ‘the current phase of 
(…) migration’ (Sassen-Koob, 1986, p. 86), or ‘the current migration phase’ (Sassen, 
1988, p. 4, cf. 2006b). 
 A mere three studies previously assessed the impact of foreign direct investments 
on immigration from less-developed economies to advanced ones (Ricketts, 1987; 
Sanderson and Kentor, 2008; Yang 1998).[1] However, they did not assess the push 
factor for migration from less-developed countries to developed ones addressed in this 
section in combination with Sassen’s pull-factor explanation as this study aims to do. As 
a result, the question whether immigration to cities in the advanced economies is driven 
by the combination of push and pull factors spawned by foreign direct investments as 
argued by Sassen yet remains unanswered (cf. Sassen, 2006b). This article aims to 
answer this question by assessing whether the growth of immigrant groups in Dutch cities 
can indeed be explained by Dutch foreign investments in the countries where these 
immigrants stem from. The central expectation to be assessed is the growth of immigrant 
populations in Dutch cities is strongest from countries where Dutch foreign direct 
investments increased most (hypothesis 1). 
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The pull factor of immigration: the clustering of advanced producer services 
As stated, Sassen combines the push factor outlined in the previous section with a pull 
factor into an overarching theoretical framework. The reason to do so is the idea that ‘the 
same set of basic processes that (…) promoted emigration from several rapidly 
industrialising countries (…) also promoted immigration into several booming global 
cities’ (1988, p. 22; cf. 2001, 2006a). The basic argument is that the coordination and 
control of the globally dispersed production process that stems from the new international 
division of labour is far more complex than that of vertical integrated firms. As a result, 
international headquarters of multinational firms outsource the production of those 
capacities to advanced producer services, such as finance, accountancy and consultancy 
(Sassen, 2001, 2006a). Those services, in their turn, cluster in cities as to be close to their 
customers, and to reap the benefits of being in knowledge-dense local networks. 
 The investment flows outlined in the previous section and this employment 
growth in the advanced producer services in cities in the advanced economies are, hence, 
two sides of the same coin. This phenomenon has been aptly summarised as 
‘decentralised centralisation’ (Sassen, 2001, 2002): a globally dispersed production 
process that is centrally managed in cities in the advanced economies. Initially this 
argument was formulated for a mere three cities as the subtitle of The Global City. New 
York, London Tokyo reveals (2001), but recently Sassen claimed that there are ‘about 40’ 
global cities nowadays (Sassen, 2006a, p. 142). This does, however, not mean that the 
clustering argument is merely formulated for the limited number of global cities such as 
Amsterdam (Sassen, 2006a). It is argued that the clustering of advanced producer 
services also occurs in cities lower in the urban hierarchy: ‘[p]arallel developments exist 
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in cities that function as regional nodes – that is, at smaller geographical scales and lower 
levels of complexity than global cities’ (Sassen, 2006a, p. 193).[2]  
 For the question at hand this is highly relevant, as it is argued that the clustering 
of advanced producer services ‘generates low wage jobs directly, through the structure of 
the work process, and indirectly, through the structure of the high income life-styles of 
those therein employed’ (Sassen-Koob, 1986, p. 99; cf. Sassen, 2006a). The direct labour 
demand refers to cleaners, clerks, security and the like (Sassen, 2006a, p. 197). The 
indirect labour demand entails ‘an army of low-wage workers’ (…) including ‘residential 
building attendants, dog-walkers, housekeepers for the two-career family, workers in the 
gourmet restaurants and food shops, French hand laundries, and so on’ (Sassen-Koob, 
1985, p. 262; cf. Sassen, 2006a), but also refers to workers in a downgraded 
manufacturing sector directed at limited runs of customized production, and employees in 
small specialised retail outlets offering limited editions consumer goods (Sassen-Koob 
1984b, 1986; Sassen 1993).  
This idea – often referred to as the polarisation thesis, as it implies hourglass-
shaped job-growth in cities: professionals at the top, and low-skilled workers at the 
bottom – is one of the central tenets of Sassen’s global city theoretical framework (2001, 
2006a), and met fierce critiques. Most notably because of Hamnett’s counterargument 
that the rising salience of services in urban economies would lead to professionalisation: 
job growth in the middle and at the top of the occupational ladder, and job loss at the 
bottom (1994). This debate has more aspects to it than can here be accounted for, and did 
yield dozens of studies that did corroborate either the polarisation thesis or the 
professionalisation thesis (Van der Waal, 2010). 
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 The results of the first studies on Dutch urban labour markets that were informed 
by the polarisation and professionalisation thesis also did not yield unequivocal support 
for the former or the latter (Burgers, 1996; Kloosterman, 1996). But recent studies that 
specifically focused on demand at the bottom of Dutch urban labour markets found 
empirical support for the polarisation thesis: Dutch cities with the highest shares of 
employment in the advanced producer services yield the highest demand for lower 
educated workers, as unemployment levels in those cities are lowest (Van der Waal 2012; 
Van der Waal and Burgers, 2009, 2011). Similar findings have been documented for 
cities in the United States (Elliott, 2004) and cities in Germany (Kasarda and Friedrichs, 
1985). This indicates that the findings are not a Dutch idiosyncrasy, but stand for a more 
general pattern in the advanced economies. 
 According to Sassen, it is this high demand for low-skilled workers spawned by 
the clustering of advanced producer services that functions as a pull factor for 
immigration from less-developed countries to cities in the advanced economies: ‘it is the 
expansion in the supply of low-wage jobs generated by major growth sectors that is one 
of the key factors in the continuation at even higher levels of the current immigration’ 
(Sassen-Koob, 1984b, p. 158; cf. Sassen, 2001, 2006a). This study will assess this notion 
by, firstly, testing the expectation that the growth of immigrant populations is strongest in 
cities with the strongest employment growth in the advanced producer services 
(hypothesis 2). If so, according to the pull-factor explanation outlined in this section this 
is, secondly, partly driven by employment growth in the industries that cater to the life-
styles of the professionals employed in those producer services (hypothesis 3). 
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Data and operationalisation 
 
To assess the impact of Dutch foreign direct investments on migration flows to Dutch 
cities, data retrieved from Statline Statistics of Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau 
voor de Statisitiek, CBS),[3] UNCTAD,[4] the World Bank,[5] the Dutch Central Bank 
(De Nederlandse Bank, DNB),[6] and the Immigration and Naturalisation Service 
(Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst, IND),[7] were combined. 
 The maximum time span of data on migration flows to Dutch cities that could be 
retrieved ranges from 1996 to 2010. The Netherlands counts 22 metropolitan 
agglomerations, including a global city – Amsterdam – for which the arguments 
addressed in this article were primarily formulated. Yet, on the basis of the theoretical 
notions outlined above, it can be expected that the clustering of advanced producer 
services in other Dutch cities will attract immigrant flows as well. To find out, the 
question whether Dutch investment flows indeed spawn migration flows in the exact 
opposite direction will therefore not merely be assessed for Amsterdam, but also for the 
22 Dutch urban agglomerations combined. 
 The assessment of the pull-factor explanation calls, of course, for a comparison of 
cities instead of immigrant sending countries, and therefore compares the 22 Dutch urban 
agglomerations. All variables are outlined below in the order in which they will appear in 
the analyses. 
 
Variables push-factor analysis 
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Growth immigrant groups – measures the increase in the number of immigrants from 
non-European, non-OECD countries by country of origin in Amsterdam (growth 
immigrants Amsterdam), and in the 22 Dutch metropolitan agglomerations combined 
(growth immigrants Netherlands) between 1996 and 2010.[8] Contrary to Ricketts 
(1987), I measured the absolute increase of immigrant groups instead of the relative 
increase – that is: total growth instead of relative to the population size of the sending 
country. The argument addressed in this article revolves around the absolute number of 
people uprooted by investments, not the relative number. 
 Table 1 presents 1) the number of all documented immigrants from non-OECD 
countries outside Europe by country of origin in 1996 and in 2009, and 2) and the growth 
in that number between those years, for both Amsterdam and the 22 Dutch metropolitan 
agglomerations combined. Three countries – former colonies – will be excluded from the 
analyses that follow: the Dutch Antilles, Indonesia and Surinam. Many of the immigrants 
from those places – of which the first is still part of the Dutch Kingdom – hold Dutch 
citizenship. Furthermore, and more important here, the bulk of people living there are 
familiar with the Netherlands and Dutch culture due to previous colonial ties. Hence, 
there is need to empirically disentangle the effect of cultural ties stemming from 
(previous) colonial bonds between (the European part of) the Netherlands on the one 
hand and Indonesia, Surinam, and the Dutch Antilles on the other, from the cultural ties 
between the Netherlands and those three countries that result from Dutch investments. 
Unfortunately, the quantitative approach used in this article does not allow the 
disentangling of the two types of cultural ties mentioned above in any other way than to 
simply remove them from the analyses. 
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 Of course, the immigrant influx in Dutch cities from the 19 countries that remain 
also can have other causes than the FDI-migration nexus that is the main focus of this 
article, such as political reasons and chain migration. However, as we will see below, 
those causes can be controlled for in the analyses that follow. 
Unfortunately, the data used do not allow selecting immigrants by education level, 
while the arguments addressed in this article obviously revolve around migration of less-
educated immigrants. The analyses will therefore be performed while controlling for the 
estimated share of so-called ‘knowledge workers’ of each immigrant group.[9] Also, one 
country of origin in the data set – Morocco – has been sending guest workers to the 
Netherlands from the 1960s onwards. Although the recruitment of guest workers stopped 
in the 1980s, the Netherlands has experienced a substantial influx of Moroccans ever 
since. For a large part, that influx is the result of so-called ‘family migration’: the 
reunification or formation of families. In the time-span under scrutiny (1996 – 2009), no 
less than 87 percent of the immigrant influx from Morocco entailed such family 
migration (own calculations by means of data from Statline Statistics Netherlands). 
Therefore, the increase in immigrants from Morocco shown in table 1 will be reduced 
with 87 percent in the analyses that follow. Of course, guest workers recruitment schemes 
did result in cultural ties between Morocco and the Netherlands that are more 
encompassing than the nuclear family ties of those that were recruited. Yet, the impact of 
those more demographically encompassing ties will be controlled for, as the analyses that 
follow will also model so-called ‘chain migration’ (see below) (data: CBS and IND). 
Growth Dutch FDI – measures the increase in FDI stock in the immigrant sending 
countries stemming from the Netherlands in the time span 1993-2006. FDI stock has thus  
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Table 1: Number of immigrants from non-OECD countries outside Europe by country of origin in 
Amsterdam and the 22 Dutch metropolitan agglomerations combined in 1996 and 2009, and the growth 
in this number between 1996 and 2009. 
 Amsterdam 22 Dutch urban agglomerations 
 1996 2009 ∆1996-2009 1996 2009 ∆1996-2009 
Afghanistan      344 1,964 1,620 1,445 10,885 9,440 
Brazil           868 1,836 968 2,345 5,469 3,124 
CapeVerde        357 314 -43 9,167 9,382 215 
China            1,504 2,854 1,350 7,455 19,117 11,662 
Colombia         590 1,257 667 2,593 5,324 2,731 
Dominican        1,170 1,462 292 3,041 4,822 1,781 
Dutch Antilles 7,398 7,370 -28 35,895 49,351 13,456 
Egypt            2,588 3,452 864 4,979 6,629 1,650 
Ethiopia         1,052 1,136 84 3,771 4,434 663 
Ghana            5,255 6,688 1,433 7,872 9,583 1,711 
Hong Kong  1,476 1,354 -122 5,706 5,573 -133 
India  1,916 3,121 1,205 4,957 9,109 4,152 
Indonesia        11,621 8,951 -2,670 64,747 51,464 -13,283 
Iran             1,396 1,999 603 6,667 11,183 4,516 
Iraq             882 1,911 1,029 3,702 13,763 10,061 
Morocco          29,635 34,184 4,549 90,617 105,679 15,062 
Pakistan         3,205 3,225 20 7,648 7,897 249 
Philippines      997 1,371 374 2,403 4,167 1,764 
Russian Federation 1,025 3,236 2,211 3,598 15,975 12,377 
Somalia          578 703 125 5,640 6,256 616 
Surinam        45,680 39,902 -5,778 126,282 118,803 -7,479 
Vietnam          110 271 161 2,680 3,833 1,153 
Total 119,647 128,561 8,914 403,210 478,698 75,488 
Source: CBS (own calculations). 
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been measured with a time-lag of three years prior to growth immigrant groups, as the 
migration effects of foreign direct investments are not likely to occur instantly – 
modelling a time-lag is therefore standard research practice in this kind of analysis. 
Instead of the relative growth in the time span under scrutiny (cf. Ricketts, 1987; 
Sanderson and Kentor, 2008; Yang, 1998), the absolute growth – that is: the total amount 
instead of the percentage of the gross domestic product of the receiving country – is used. 
This is most in accordance to the theoretical rationale addressed in this article: the 
absolute amount is a more accurate measure of the number of people employed in FDI-
driven production sites / export processing zones than the relative amount. These are the 
people that are likely to be ‘pushed’ towards migration. Growth Dutch FDI proved to be 
strongly skewed – it had a skewness score of more than 2 – and therefore its logarithmic 
form will be used in the analyses that follow (data: UNCTAD). 
Growth total FDI – measures the increase in total FDI stock in the immigrant 
sending countries in the time span 1993-2006 in a similar way as Growth Dutch FDI. It is 
used for empirically disentangling the ‘long recognized westernization effect of large-
scale foreign investment’ (Sassen, 1988, p. 18-19), from the effects induced by the 
cultural links stemming from Dutch FDI. It is after all the latter that we are interested in 
for explaining migration flows to Dutch cities, while the former might also be responsible 
for (part) of that migration. Growth total FDI is strongly skewed – its skewness score is 
above 2 – and therefore its logarithmic form will be used in the analyses that follow 
(data: UNCTAD). 
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Population growth – is the first indicator used as to control for classical migration 
theories. It is measured as the population growth in the immigrant sending countries 
between 1999 and 2000, as a percentage of the population in 1999 (data: World Bank). 
Gross domestic product per capita – is the second indicator that will be used as to 
control for classical migration theories. It measures the gross domestic product of the 
immigrant sending countries in the year 2000 divided by their population size (data: 
World Bank).  
 Distance – for a proper test of both the FDI-migration nexus and classical 
migration theories there is need for control variables. The first one of these measures the 
distance between the immigrant sending country and the Netherlands, as it is expected 
that long distances will hamper migration (cf. Portes, 2000) (data: 
http://www.timeanddate.com/). 
 Asylum requests – is the second control variable. Various immigrant sending 
countries experienced political turmoil during the time span assessed in this article; most 
notably Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Somalia. Hence, part of the immigrant influx from 
those countries entails refugees that have been granted access in the Netherlands on the 
basis of human-rights treaties. To empirically disentangle such immigration from that 
which stems from FDI investments and/or population pressures and underdevelopment, 
the analyses will control for the number of asylum requests the Netherlands received 
from all countries in the dataset in the period under scrutiny (data: CBS). 
 Immigrants 1996 – as to control for chain migration (Portes, 2000), the third 
control variable measures the number of immigrants from each country in the first year of 
the assessed time span in Amsterdam (immigrants 1996 Amsterdam), and the 22 Dutch 
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urban agglomerations combined (immigrants 1996 Netherlands). Both measures had a 
skewness score of more than 2, and will therefore be entered in the analyses in 
logarithmic form (data: CBS). 
 Table 2 presents the bivariate relationships between all variables for the push-
factor analysis. Besides some obvious strong correlates – i.e. between 1) growth 
immigrants Amsterdam and growth immigrants Netherlands, 2) immigrants 1996 
Amsterdam and immigrants 1996 Netherlands and 3) Dutch FDI and total FDI – several 
relationships are quite informing. Firstly, asylum requests is strongly correlated to growth 
immigrants Netherlands, but not to growth immigrants Amsterdam. This mirrors Dutch 
migration policies, as housing arranged for asylum seekers is scattered across the country. 
Furthermore, as the number of asylum requests can be considered a measure of political 
turmoil, the strong negative correlation with total FDI does not surprise: political 
instability hampers the influx of foreign investments. 
 Secondly, the bivariate relationships between both measures of immigrant growth 
and Dutch FDI are positive, as could be expected on the basis of the FDI-migration 
nexus. Yet, in the end the litmus test for the empirical validity of that nexus cannot be 
determined by a bivariate relationship, as such a test needs to control for other 
explanations, and will be done in the upcoming analyses.   
 
Variables pull factor analysis 
Growth immigrant share – measures the increase of the immigrant population between 
1997 and 2008 in the 22 metropolitan agglomerations as the share of the working 
population in 1997. This increase has been measured while controlling for the number of 
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Table 2: zero-order correlations  (N = 19) 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Growth immigrants 
Amsterdam (1) 0.826** 0.467* 0.234 -0.175 -0.180 -0.358 0.230 0.121 -0.159 
Growth immigrants 
Netherlands (2) - 0.368 0.136 -0.140 -0.127 -0.326 0.560* -0.113 -0.244 
Dutch FDI (3)  - 0.721** 0.434~ -0.619** 0.169 -0.234 -0.027 -0.188 
Total FDI (4)   - 0.604** -0.770** 0.245 -0.533* 0.206 0.034 
GDP per capita (5)    - -0.495* 0.174 -0.322 0.234 0.222 
Population growth 
(6)     - -0.130 0.482* 0.068 -0.105 
Distance (7)      - -0.280 -0.439~ -0.492* 
Asylum requests (8)       - -0.253 -0.195 
Migrant stock 
Amsterdam (9)        - 0.762** 
Migrant stock 
Netherlands (10)         - 
Source: OECD, World Bank, UNCTAD, FNB, IND, and CBS (own calculations). 
~p< 0.10; * p< 0.05; ** p< 0.01. 
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knowledge workers and family migration from Morocco (compare the measurement of 
growth immigrant groups for the push-factor analysis). Growth immigrant share has a 
slightly smaller data range than the one used when assessing the push-factor explanation, 
because the data for the pull factor could not be retrieved for such a wide range of years 
(see below) (data: CBS). 
Growth employment advanced producer services – measures the growth in the 
share of the working population in each agglomeration that is employed in firms 
classified in class J (finance), and class K (real estate and producer services) in the 
International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities of the United 
Nations (ISIC Rev. 3.1). The maximum data-range that could be retrieved ranges from 
1995 to 2008. As such, it measures the employment growth two years prior to the growth 
in the immigrant share in the working population. Such a two-year time lag is standard 
research practice in labour market studies because the migration effects of labour demand 
are not likely to occur instantly (data: CBS). 
Growth employment hotel and catering industry and growth personal services and 
cultural activities – measure the growth in the share of the working population that is 
employed in firms classified in class H and O in the ISIC Rev. 3.1 classification 
respectively, between 1995 and 2008. For similar reasons, both have, just as growth 
employment advanced producer services, been measured with a two-year time lag. In line 
with Sassen’s pull-factor explanation, it would be optimal if the impact of the share of 
employment in private households (class P in the ‘ISIC Rev. 3.1’) could also be 
modelled. Unfortunately, it is not available at metropolitan level in the Netherlands. Also, 
metropolitan-level data do not allow to model employment in 1) in a downgraded 
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manufacturing sector directed at limited runs of customized production, and 2) small 
specialized retail outlets offering limited editions of ‘hipster’ consumer goods, as these 
cannot be empirically disentangled from 1) large-scale mass production and 2) large-scale 
wholesale and retail trade in the ISIC Rev. 3.1 classification, respectively (data: CBS). 
Immigrants 1997 – measures the share of immigrants in the working population of 
each agglomeration in 1997. It will be used as a control variable for chain migration 
(Portes, 2000), and the notion that the consumption of low-wage immigrants in itself 
spawns labour demand that attracts new waves of immigration (Sassen-Koob 1984b, 
1986; Sassen 1993) (data: CBS). 
 
 
Results 
 
Assessing Dutch FDI as push factor  
Table 3 contains the analysis that tests the FDI-migration nexus for migration to 
Amsterdam, while table 4 contains that analysis for migration to the 22 Dutch urban 
agglomerations combined.[10] In the first model, it is shown that the coefficients of two 
out of three control variables are in the expected direction: the highest immigrant growth 
stems from countries that are most nearby, and a high number of asylum requests is 
accompanied by high immigrant growth. The number of immigrants in 1996 is, contrary 
to what can be expected on the basis of arguments centring on chain migration, not 
positively related to immigrant growth. 
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Table 3: growth immigrant groups in Amsterdam (1996-2009) explained by 1) growth in (Dutch) foreign 
direct investments, 2) population growth, and 3) GDP per capita (regression analysis; entries are standardized 
regression coefficients; estimation: ordinary least squares). 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Independents β Β β β VIF 
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Growth total FDI 0.562* 0.106 _ _  
Growth Dutch FDI  0.572~ 0.593** 0.687** 1.730 
Population growth    -0.096 2.161 
GDP per capita    -0.390* 1.405 
      
Controls      
Distance -0.422~ -0.373~ -0.385* -0.359* 1.115 
Asylum requests 0.390~ 0.312 0.261 0.210 1.429 
Immigrants 1996 -0.081 0.029 _ _  
R² 0.362 0.479 0.474 0.583  
N 19 19 19 19  
Source: OECD, World Bank, UNCTAD, FNB, IND, and CBS (own calculations). 
~p< 0.10; * p< 0.05; ** p< 0.01, one-sided. 
 
Model 1 in both table 3 and 4 also contains the indicator for the total FDI in the 
immigrant-sending countries, which yields a quite strong positive significant coefficient: 
a high level of investment in immigrant sending countries is accompanied by a high 
immigrant influx from those countries in both Amsterdam and the 22 Dutch urban 
agglomerations combined. This points in the direction of a general westernisation effect 
of FDI as has previously been emphasised by scholars such as Sassen (1988) and Massey 
(1988). But our primary interest in this article is whether Dutch FDI spawns immigration 
to the Netherlands, and therefore growth Dutch FDI is entered into model 2 of table 3 
and4. 
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Table 4: growth immigrant groups in 22 Dutch urban agglomerations (1996-2009) explained by 1) growth in 
(Dutch) foreign direct investments, 2) population growth, and 3) GDP per capita (regression analysis; entries 
are standardized regression coefficients; estimation: ordinary least squares). 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Independents β β β β VIF 
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Growth total FDI 0.633** 0.459* 0.374~ 0.578* 3.522 
Growth Dutch FDI  0.211 0.320~ 0.319~ 2.231 
Population growth    _  
GDP per capita    -0.338* 1.576 
      
Controls      
Distance -0.461* -0.434* -0.258~ -0.249~ 1.104 
Asylum requests 0.699** 0.673** 0.762** 0.764** 1.547 
Immigrants 1996 -0.356 -0.302 _ _  
R² 0.633 0.732 0.679 0.752  
N 19 19 19 19  
Source: OECD, World Bank, UNCTAD, FNB, IND, and CBS (own calculations). 
~p< 0.10; * p< 0.05; ** p< 0.01, one-sided. 
 
 In the table containing the analysis on migration flows to Amsterdam, the positive 
impact of Dutch FDI on those flows is rather strong. What is more, it does completely 
take over the effect of total FDI. This indicates that the influx of immigrants into 
Amsterdam – at least from 1996 onwards – is partly driven by the cultural links that stem 
from Dutch FDI in their countries of origin, and not by an all-encompassing 
westernisation effect that accompanies FDI in general. For the immigrant flows into the 
22 Dutch urban agglomerations combined, this seems less clear. Although there is a 
positive effect of Dutch FDI that partly accounts for the effect of total FDI, it is less 
convincing than in the case of Amsterdam. 
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 Considering the small number of countries in the data set, all variables that thus 
far proved irrelevant have been removed in model 3. For the analysis on Amsterdam 
(table 3) this means that growth total FDI and immigrants 1996 have been removed, 
while for the analysis on the 22 urban agglomerations combined only the latter has been 
removed. For Amsterdam this does not alter the findings thus far, while for the 22 
agglomerations combined the effect of Dutch FDI increases in strength, while the effect 
of total FDI decreases in strength. Immigration to Amsterdam, then, seems to be driven 
by Dutch FDI, while immigration to the 22 Dutch urban agglomerations combined seems 
to be driven by both forms of FDI. This points in the direction that the latter immigration 
is the result of both a general westernisation effect and of cultural ties stemming from 
Dutch FDI, while the former immigration is merely the result of Dutch cultural ties 
accompanying Dutch FDI. To validate those findings they need at least to be confronted 
with the most dominant theories on migration from less-developed economies to 
developed ones: classical migration theories that focus on population pressures and 
underdevelopment.  
The last step in the analyses on the push-factor explanation, presented in model 4 
in tables 3 and 4, therefore adds the indicators for classical migration theories: population 
growth and/or GDP per capita. They have both been entered into table 3, while only the 
latter has been entered into table 4. This because the latter table contains one more 
variable, while minimising the number of variables seems appropriate due to the small 
number of countries in the data set. Note however that including population growth in 
table 4 does not alter the presented findings.[11] The analyses on both Amsterdam and 
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the 22 Dutch urban agglomerations combined show that both Sassen’s FDI-migration 
nexus and classical migration theories can explain the increase in immigrants. 
Not only has the impact of Dutch FDI maintained when confronted with 
indicators for classical migration theory, but the latter theory also has explanatory value: 
a low GDP per capita in immigrant-sending countries results in a high immigrant increase 
in both Amsterdam and the 22 Dutch urban agglomerations combined. The last model in 
both tables also includes the variance inflation factors (VIF), which are all far below the 
score of 10. This means that, despite the sometimes high correlation between independent 
variables (see table 2), there is no severe multicollinearity (Myers, 1990). All in all, it 
seems therefore safe to conclude that hypothesis 1 – the growth of immigrant populations 
in Dutch cities is strongest from countries where Dutch foreign direct investments 
increased most – is corroborated. 
 
Assessing advanced producer service growth as pull factor 
If the pull-factor explanation in the FDI-migration nexus as it has been formulated by 
Sassen is correct, it can be expected that in Dutch cities where employment in the 
advanced producer services increased most the growth of immigrants also increased most 
(hypothesis 2). It can on the basis of the same explanation furthermore be expected that 
this will be partly driven by the increase in employment in 1) the hotel and catering 
industry, and 2) personal services and cultural activities: those sectors are claimed to 
cater to the professionals employed in the advanced producer services (hypothesis 3). To 
find out, table 5 will in the first model assess the impact of the employment growth in the 
advanced producer services on the growth in the immigrant share in the working 
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population in the 22 Dutch urban agglomerations. In the second model it is assessed 
whether the hypothesised effect of those services can (partly) be accounted for by 
employment in the hotel and catering industry and personal services and cultural 
activities as suggested in Sassen’s pull-factor explanation. Just as the analysis on the 
push-factor explanation, this analysis will, furthermore, control for chain migration: 
immigrant settlement might also result from ethnic ties and networks (Portes, 2000), and 
from the demand for immigrant labour driven by already settled immigrants as suggested 
by Sassen (Sassen-Koob 1984b, 1986; Sassen 1993). 
 
Table 5: growth immigrant share in the working population in 22 Dutch urban agglomerations (1997-2007) 
explained by growth in employment share of advanced producer services (1995-2007) (regression analysis; 
entries are standardized regression coefficients; estimation: ordinary least squares). 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Independents Β β VIF 
Constant 0.000 0.000  
Growth employment advanced producer services -0.047 -0.015 1.179 
Growth employment hotel and catering industry  0.171 1.077 
Growth personal services and cultural activities  -0.060 1.128 
    
Controls    
Immigrant stock 1997 0.613** 0.651** 1.279 
R² 0.359 0.385  
N 22 22  
Source: CBS (own calculations). 
~p< 0.10; * p< 0.05; ** p< 0.01, one-sided. 
 
 
Contrary to her push-factor explanation, Sassen’s pull-factor explanation for 
immigrant flows from developing countries to cities in the developed economies does not 
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yield any empirical support for the Dutch case. Immigrant growth is not significantly 
related to the growth in employment in the advanced producer services. If it would be, 
employment growth in 1) the hotel and catering industry, and in 2) personal services and 
cultural activities could not account for it as both yield insignificant coefficients. Both 
hypotheses 2 and 3, deducted from the pull-factor explanation, therefore need to be 
rejected. The pull-factor rationale in Sassen’s FDI-migration nexus cannot account for the 
settlement of immigrants in Dutch cities, and that settlement, hence, calls for another 
explanation. 
 Chain migration seems to be such an alternative explanation, as the indicator for it 
in this analysis has a quite strong positive effect on immigrant growth. It should, 
however, be noted that it is a rather crude indicator as it does not discriminate between 
immigrant-sending countries. In the Netherlands, then, immigrants settle in cities where 
already many immigrants reside, and that is clearly not because such cities have an 
abundance of labour-market opportunities directly or indirectly driven by employment 
growth in advanced producer services as theorised by Sassen. How the chain migration 
exactly comes about, however, is another chapter and goes beyond the scope of this 
study. The concluding section will further elaborate on these findings. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This article assessed the central claims in Sassen’s FDI-migration nexus for immigration 
from less-developed economies to Dutch cities. This nexus combines a push-factor 
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explanation which revolves around investment flows, with a pull-factor explanation 
which revolves around demand for low-skilled workers due to the clustering of advanced 
producer services in cities. Sassen combined these factors into one framework on the 
basis of the idea that they share a root cause: the new international division of labour due 
to the (re)location of parts of the production process from developed economies to newly 
industrialising ones. 
  The analyses suggest that the claim concerning the push factor for migration from 
developing economies to developed ones is correct when applied to Dutch cities. 
Controlled for factors that according to classical migration theories drive such 
immigration – underdevelopment and population pressures –, and a wide-ranging 
westernisation effect that allegedly accompanies FDI influx in general, Dutch 
investments in less-developed economies were demonstrated to increase migration flows 
from those countries to Dutch cities between 1996 and 2010. 
 Besides that this finding is in line with the push-factor argument in Sassen’s FDI-
migration nexus, which will be dealt with later on, it raises serious questions about policy 
arguments derived from the ‘the root causes’ (Martin, 1995, p. 820) of immigration from 
less-developed economies to the advanced ones: underdevelopment, ‘low wages and few 
jobs’ (Martin, 1995, p. 820). In line with these causes it is claimed that ‘immigration 
countries can influence the propensity to emigrate from other countries through three 
major economic channels – trade, investment, aid’ (Martin, 1995, p. 820). Although 
investments in less-developed economies indeed lead to economic growth (Hahm and 
Heo, 2008), this article indicates, that such growth does not have unequivocal 
consequences when it comes to migration pressures. As far as economic growth is driven 
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by foreign direct investments, it is likely to lead to decreasing emigration due to 
improving economic conditions on the one hand, while it, on the other hand, strengthens 
or even initiates emigration due to the cultural and objective links with countries where 
such investments come from. All this should be interpreted with care however as the 
corroboration of the ‘FDI drives emigration argument’ in this study is based on 
investments from one advanced economy in a limited number of less-developed 
economies. On the other hand, one should keep in mind that three earlier studies also 
corroborated this link at country level. Yet, future research could shed more light on this 
‘development paradox’ when it comes to migration from less-developed economies to 
advanced ones. 
Although findings in this article are in line with Sassen’s push factor argument, 
more research is needed as to uncover its empirically validity. In the first place because 
the central mechanism of this explanation revolves around the uprooting of people due to 
the introduction of the capitalistic logic of wage-labour. This study is unable to validating 
such a claim, as it calls for ethnographic research in the export processing zones of 
immigrant sending countries. 
The second, and probably most substantial reason why future research could shed 
more light on the validity of Sassen’s push-factor explanation, is that the findings in this 
study can also be interpreted according to another theory. It basically claims that outward 
FDI flows are initiated by immigrants, instead of the other way round (Kugler and 
Rapoport, 2007). In this line of reasoning, it is the information immigrants have about 
investment opportunities in their country of origin that drives these investment flows, and 
it can consequently be expected that it refers to highly-educated immigrants. Considering 
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that this study could only control for knowledge workers by using a crude measure for it, 
future research on the causal direction of the relationship between FDI and immigration 
that was found in this study becomes even more relevant. Yet, as foreign direct 
investments were measured three years prior to migration flows in this study, it seems 
very unlikely that the results actually measure the investment flows from immigrants in 
Dutch cities to their home countries. 
Contrary to the push-factor explanation, the pull-factor explanation in Sassen’s 
FDI-migration nexus could not be empirically corroborated. Previous studies indeed 
showed that Dutch cities with a high employment share in the advanced producer services 
have the smallest mismatch between labour demand and labour supply at the bottom of 
the labour market. However, the high labour demand in those cities proves not to be a 
pull factor for the new immigration: growth in the immigrant population in Dutch cities 
was neither related to growth in advanced producer services, nor to the growth in the 
sectors that allegedly cater to the life styles of the professionals employed in those 
services. Even if the latter growth would be related to immigrant growth, this would not 
be in accordance to the theoretical rationale of Sassen’s pull-factor explanation, as it 
predicts that this relationship needs to (partly) account for the effect of advanced 
producer services’ growth. There is, however, no effect of the growth in those services on 
immigrant growth in the first place. This indicates that the data limitations for modelling 
the labour demand driven by the life-styles of the professionals employed in the advanced 
producer services cannot be responsible for the finding that immigrant growth in Dutch 
cities is not in accordance to Sassen’s pull-factor explanation. 
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What might account for this finding is Hamnett’s (1994) critique on Sassen’s 
polarisation thesis. European welfare regimes might inhibit the creation of a ‘service 
proletariat’ and a downgraded manufacturing sector directed at the production of 
speciality items and limited edition garments demanded by the upper occupational strata, 
as the relatively high wages at the bottom end of the labour market hamper the local 
commodification of these activities. It needs to be emphasised here that the pull-factor 
explanation assessed in this article was primarily formulated with the New York labour 
market in mind. The results of this study, however, imply that this explanation does not 
travel well beyond such relatively unregulated urban economies. In the end, however, this 
is an empirical question that only future research can decide. 
Besides the Dutch welfare regime, kinship, ethnic or social ties with former waves 
of immigrants might influence where immigrants decide to live (cf. Zorlu and Mulder, 
2008), whether this improves their labour-market position or not. And the strong impact 
of the indicator for chain migration in the pull-factor analysis strongly points in that 
direction. However, part of this ‘chain migration’ might, in the end, be related to labour 
demand by means of other mechanisms than the pull-factor explanation assessed in this 
article. Firstly, the presence of immigrant communities might in itself lead to labour 
demand in the industries that cater to those communities, attracting new waves of 
immigrants (Sassen-Koob 1984b, 1986; Sassen 1993). If so, (part of) the substantial 
effect of the indicator for chain migration in the pull-factor analysis in the end needs to be 
interpreted according to labour-market logic. Secondly, the data used in this article do not 
allow uncovering whether labour demand in the informal economy attracts new waves of 
immigrants. Yet, if such an informal economy would be directed at serving the 
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consumption pattern of the professionals employed in the advanced producer services as 
theorised by Sassen (Sassen-Koob 1984b, 1986; Sassen 1993), one would expect an 
effect of advanced producer services’ growth in the analysis on the pull-factor 
explanation. That the growth in those services had no effect on immigrant growth is 
therefore at odds with that theorising. 
All that said, this study is the first attempt at assessing Sassen’s FDI-migration 
nexus empirically, and it had to deal with various limitations. Future research therefore 
needs to decide whether its main findings – the push-factor explanation is empirically 
valid while the pull-factor explanation is not – are robust, and how far they travel beyond 
the Dutch case. 
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Notes 
 
[1] Although there are more studies on the impact of foreign direct investments on 
migration, those specifically focused on knowledge workers. 
[2] The question whether a globally dispersed production process underlies the vast 
increase in employment in services in cities in the developed economies is still open, and 
most empirical studies on this matter point towards other explanations (Van der Waal, 
2010). Yet, it is the leading idea that underlies Sassen’s claim that the push and pull 
factor addressed in this study are two sides of the same coin. 
[3] http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb/?LA=en. 
[4] http://www.unctad.org/. 
[5] http://web.worldbank.org/. 
[6] http://www.dnb.nl/en/home/index.jsp. 
[7] http://english.ind.nl/. 
[8] European countries from the former East Block are left out of the analyses, as these 
countries joined the European Union in the assessed time span, and some of these joined 
the OECD. This was accompanied by another regulatory regime for labour movement. 
Consequently, the extent to which immigration from these countries to the Netherlands is 
driven by Dutch FDI and the extent to which this is driven by that regime change is 
impossible to disentangle empirically. 
[9] Since 2004, the IND registered the number of knowledge workers that applied for 
residence in the Netherlands (INDIAC 2009). Their figures indicate that from the 19 
countries in the data set, 3 did send a substantial number of such immigrants: India, China 
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and Russia. The average annual number of knowledge workers from these countries 
between 2005 and 2009 are taken as a percentage of the total increase of immigrants from 
those countries in that time span. This would mean that between 2005 and 2009, 11.8 
percent of the Russian immigrants, 27.8 percent of Chinese immigrants, and 128 percent 
of Indian immigrants in the data set were knowledge workers. These percentages are used 
as an indicator for the share of knowledge workers from these countries in the complete 
time span assessed in this article (1996-2009). In the analyses, the growth in the number 
of Russian, Chinese, and Indian immigrants has therefore been reduced by 11.8 percent, 
27.8 percent, and 100 percent respectively. That the number of knowledge workers from 
India in the Netherlands as a whole exceeds the total number of Indian immigrants who 
settled in the 22 Dutch metropolitan agglomerations combined in the assessed time span, 
indicates that the number of knowledge workers is overestimated in the analyses. This 
means that the FDI-immigration nexus is tested more strictly. 
[10] All variables have been standardised in the analyses as to improve the comparability 
of the coefficients. 
[11] Findings available upon request. 
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